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 Abstract 
Countries adopt different methods and processes to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
health technologies. It is important to identify and analyse the factors that influence 
the uptake and use of these methods and processes across countries.  In this paper, we 
introduce a regulatory governance approach to the analysis of convergence, 
divergence and hybridity in HTA methods, discussing and critically analysing 
national processes for HTA in two major European Union (EU) Member States: 
England and Germany.  We argue that any reasonably sophisticated account of 
national approaches to HTA must recognise that globalisation and the emergence of 
advanced industrial society involves the potential for widely varying processes, 
methods and evidential requirements.  We suggest that this potentiality also confronts 
health policy analysts with the challenge of constructing analytical frameworks 
capable of identifying the diverse institutional, domestic and other factors that shape 
national approaches to HTA.   
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1. Social Science Research and Health Technology Assessment  
Social science research is having an increasingly important impact on the development 
and operation of advanced industrial societies.  With the arrival of the digital era, the 
social sciences are influencing public policy across a wide variety of sectors, contributing 
to the development of firms and markets, and shaping wider societal understandings of 
policy problems and debates regarding their solutions.  In the healthcare sector, the 
influence of social science research is evident in government responses to the exponential 
growth in the availability of new health technologies and treatment options with the 
capacity to improve health and quality of life.  In Europe and around the world, 
policymakers have attempted to ensure equitable access to novel and often expensive 
health technologies by establishing independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) for Health 
Technology Assessment (HTA), such as the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health 
Care (IQWiG) in Germany and the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence 
(NICE) in England.  These agencies produce evaluations of new health technologies, 
which incorporate economic,epidemiological and public health evidence, among other 
elements. These assessments support policies on reimbursement, pricing and the use of 
technologies in clinical practice.  In principle, national IRAs for HTA deliver more 
legitimate, transparent and accountable methods and processes by which governments 
can respond to the challenge of delivering efficient and equitable public access to new 
health technologies.  For the future, the role of these agencies within national policy 
making processes is likely to expand as a wider and more sophisticated array of treatment 
options becomes available to patients, thus placing additional pressure on national health 
budgets. 
 
Despite their common remits, roles and aims, national IRAs for HTA differ markedly in 
terms of their structure, operation, use of evidence and methods for the conduct of 
evaluations.  Across the EU, governments also differ with regard to how they employ 
evidence generated through HTA within national decision-making processes.  These 
variations, and their potential to impact national health policies and practices, hold 
consequences for the delivery of efficient and equitable health services, and ultimately 
for the improvement of population health.  For these reasons, there has been significant 
debate and research regarding the most appropriate methods and process for establishing 
the value of health technologies.  For example, some European analysts have advocated 
initiatives for pursuing a systematic approach to the evaluation health technologies across 
the EU and for adapting evaluations of individual technologies for cross border use  
(Dickinson et al 2003; Lothgren and Ratcliffe 2004; Draborg and Andersen 2006; Turner 
et al 2009).  Others have argued for increased levels of cooperation and exchange of HTA 
evaluations for the purpose of reducing expenditure and the duplication of work 
programmes (Hutton et al. 2008; Kristensen 2008; EMA 2011).  And more specifically, 
some have suggested that national HTA agencies should collaborate with European 
regulatory authorities towards the better congruence of licensing and reimbursement 
requirements to ensure that comparative efficacy data has a formal role in European drug 
approvals (Sorenson et al 2011).  Overall, most health policy analysts have aimed to 
smooth and ameliorate instances of national divergence in assessment processes rather 
than to explain and analyse them in a critical way.  As a result, there has been limited 
amount of research conducted on the broader national contexts within which methods and 
processes for HTA are embedded, the factors that influence the uptake of different 
methods and processes and their subsequent impact on policy and practice.   
 
 
2. Comparative Policy Research and Regulatory Governance 
The study of hybridity and divergence in national processes for HTA involves the 
challenge of constructing an analytical framework capable of identifying the institutional, 
domestic and other factors that shape national approaches (Klingler et el 2013; Shah et al 
2014; Barron et el 2014).  Typically, where health policy analysts have conducted studies 
of varying national approaches to HTA, they have adopted the perspective of 
comparative policy research.  Broadly speaking, the comparative approach involves the 
comparison and analysis of national health systems with a view to understanding why 
these behave in certain ways and what policy-makers can do to improve their 
performance (WHO 2000).  Comparative approaches are concerned withthe identification 
of policy configurations across national borders, with the aim to highlight the factors that 
produce comparable or dissimilar outcomes in different jurisdictions (Marmor et al 
2005).  In terms of HTA, some comparative studies offer collections of national case 
studies and describe various institutions, roles and responsibilities. Others compare 
national studies and emphasize themes such as competition and privatization. Some offer 
statistical and largely descriptive reports that highlight data on a number of countries 
assumed to constitute a coherent class, analyzing the impact of HTA on policymaking 
across national contexts (Morgan et al 2006; Sorensen et al 2008; Chalkidou 2009). 
Others evaluate the role of HTAs within a particular therapeutic class, such as oncology 
or diabetes (Chalkidou et al 2009; Kanavos et al 2010; Sorenson and Chalkidou 2012).   
 
However, comparative approaches are not well suited to the study of divergence and 
hybridity in national approaches to HTA.  Typically, comparative studies deliver largely 
functional accounts of specific national organizations (e.g. NICE and IQWiG), supposing 
that these are broadly similar organizations and the sole sources of legitimacy and power 
within the decision making frame.  For example, some analysts assert a distinction 
between HTA as an evaluation process and a context-specific appraisal process. The 
former is a process for producing knowledge about new medicines, or the structured 
analysis of a health-care technology, which is transferable across national contexts; the 
latter is a process that translates the analysis into policy advice and decision-making 
(Stevens and Milne 2004).  Applying such distinctions, comparative approaches tend to 
conclude with analytical summations of common policy lessons, core sets of structural, 
technical, and procedural requirements for the conduct of HTA that apply across 
jurisdictions.  And, in this way, comparative studies remain largely insensitive to the 
wider range of institutional, contextual and other factors that influence uptake and use of 
methods and process in various countries.   
 
However, regulatory governance scholarship offers both an additional lens through which 
to conceptualise the study national methods and process for HTA, and also an appropriate 
frame through which to analyse divergence and hybridity.  Regulation is a subset of 
governance scholarship concerned with the analysis of steering and other regulatory 
activities, as opposed to activity concerned with providing and distributing goods and 
services (Braithwaite 2008).  In conceptualising national divergences for HTA, regulatory 
scholars would argue that some policy sectors are more likely to exhibit hybridity and 
divergence at the national level than others (Levi-Faur 2006a, 2006b).  Globalisation 
affects policy sectors, markets, and regulatory regimes to different degrees.  In banking 
and finance, both markets and regulations are global.  In the healthcare and other sectors, 
however, both markets and regulations are national because governments differ with 
respect to how much and what kind of services and protections they offer.  With regard to 
health technologies, regulations are subject to globalisation, but markets are not 
(Braithwaite and Drahos 2000).  In other words, manufacturing practices for 
pharmaceuticals have been internationally standardized to a very high degree, but 
individual nation states remain the monopolistic buyers in the largest markets, and so the 
regulatory practices for HTA are mostly national (Levi-Faur 2006b).  Accordingly, a 
regulatory governance lens would suggest that there is significant scope, relative to other 
sectors, for national healthcare policy, and process for HTA, to become more political 
than technical, and more parochial than structural.  Therefore, health policy analysts 
would expect that national processes for HTA would display major differences 
withregards to methods, institutions and evidential requirements.  In the context of 
advanced industrial society, health policy analysts might even become more circumspect 
about the extent to which national process and methods for HTA can be usefully distilled 
from one national context to another, and perhaps more interested in identifying and 
critically analysing instances of divergence and hybridity.  
 
Today, ‘regulatory space’ is an emerging analytical frame through which scholars are 
beginning to approach the study of national methods and process for HTA (Klingler et al 
2013).  Regulatory space is a holistic concept within the field of regulatory governance 
that frames steering and other regulatory activities within a spatially defined context 
(Hancher and Moran 1989).  Compared with the comparative policy lens, a regulatory 
space approach denies the distinction between HTA as a twofold process of assessment 
and appraisal (Shah et al 2014; Barron et el 2014).  Under a regulatory space frame, 
appraisal and assessment processes are mutually constitutive (Klingler et al 2013).  
Accordingly, the wide range of issues to which decisions regarding the use of 
pharmaceuticals is subjected defines the boundaries of the HTA ‘regulatory space’.  For 
example, a regulatory space approach to HTA can involve the analysis of public policy 
networks, institutions and wider historical trends and cultural preferences.  It may draw 
attention to the multiplicity of actors who do, or have the potential to, participate in the 
HTA process.  In addition, it might also highlight the historical, political and cultural 
content of the national decision making environment, relating these to the use and mix of 
particular agencies and methods of operation (Klingler et al 2013).  Or, as in the 
following sections, a regulatory space approach might also focus on the influence of 
formal organizations and agencies, analysing their structure, their rules and techniques 
for enforcement and compliance with a view to delineating the nuances, commonalities 
and divergences of individual regulatory governance systems and improving their 
operation. 
  
3. Institutions and Process for HTA in England 
In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) offers universal healthcare free at the point 
of access for the entire population of the UK.  In England and Wales, the HTA process is 
conducted through two institutions: NICE and the Department of Health (DH).  NICE is 
an independent regulatory organisation tasked with providing national guidance on 
improving health and preventing disease.  It produces clinical guidelines and public 
health recommendations.  It is responsible for setting quality standards for healthcare and 
ensuring equal access to high quality services across the country.  NICE also administers 
a wide range of internationally respected knowledge databases, such as NHS Evidence, 
the Cochrane Library, British National Formulary (BNF) and the Map of Medicine, 
which provide access to clinical guidelines, drug information, academic journals and 
clinical summaries (NICE 2009).   
However, NICE is perhaps best known for producinghealth technology assessments, 
which form the basis of its recommendations to local health authorities on whether or not 
new medicines, procedures and medical devices should be part of the basic benefits 
packaged, in others words, whether health technology covered under the NHS.   
 
 
Established in 1999, NICE is considered to sit at the interface of scientific knowledge and 
practical policy making, where some commentators suggest it “sets the benchmark for the 
use of HTA placed at the centre of a transparent and consultative decision-making 
process”, which derives from the discipline of evidence-based medicine (EBM) and, 
ultimately, from the enlightenment (Stevens and Longson 2013, p. 324; Stevens and 
Milne 2004).  Beyond these plaudits, however, NICE is essentially a decision-making 
organisation, although in principle, it is classed as an advisory body.  A positive NICE 
recommendation regarding a particular health technology, assuming it is approved by the 
DH, involves a legal requirement for the NHS to make the technology available for 
patients.  Analysing NICE’s role within the NHS, some scholars have asserted a 
distinction between HTA as an assessment process, or the “analytical process of 
gathering and summarizing information about health technologies”, and HTA as an 
appraisal process, or the “political process of making a decision about health 
technologies, taking into account assessment information but also values and other 
factors” (Stevens and Milne 2004, p. 11).   
 
Utilising this distinction, NICE assessments produce cost-effectiveness and cost-utility 
data regarding the use of new technologies, which derive from a variety of sources: 
systematic reviews of published studies; cost-effectiveness modelling based on estimates 
derived from a systematic review; indirect comparisons, in the absence of head-to-head 
studies comparing the clinical and cost-effectiveness of new technologies; and, review 
and critique of and economic models provided by the manufacturer (Stevens and Milne 
2004).  Today, much of NICE’s work program involves review and critique of existing 
models with a view to providing speedy advice on new medicines, through the single 
technology appraisal programme.  During the course of a technology assessment, NICE 
appoints an Evidence Review Group, which evaluates the manufacturer’s submission and 
advises the Appraisal Committee.  In producing cost-effectiveness and cost utility data, 
the group uses the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), which defines the 
marginal health gain for new technologies in terms of quality-adjusted life years (QALY) 
against the savings attributable to the product.  QALYs integrate changes in life years and 
quality of life into a single benefit measure that applies across therapeutic areas. The 
derivation of the ICER requires that an economic model is constructed and parameterised 
from a particular perspective (e.g. health system, third-party payer, societal, etc.).  The 
generation of the model ICER requires a number of inputs, such as a suitable comparator 
together with acquisition, treatment, administrative and monitoring costs.  While these 
inputs are subject to significantqualitative and quantitative uncertainty, they also heighten 
the importance attached to the activities of NICE’s Appraisal Committees (Rawlins et al 
2013) 
 
NICE Appraisal Committees convene a meeting of the assessment panel, clinical experts, 
and patient representatives.  On the basis of their discussions, the Appraisal Committee 
prepares an initial Consultation Document, on which it seeks feedback from stakeholders, 
such as patient groups, manufacturers and clinicians.  Those wishing to offer comment 
are invited to return for the final meeting of the appraisal committee, at which a binding 
decision regarding the technology is made (Stevens and Milne 2004).  Throughout this 
appraisal process, two economic values are critical: firstly, the ICER and the comparator 
against which it is derived; and secondly, the cost effectiveness threshold to which the 
ICER is compared.  The threshold represents the opportunity cost of health care at which 
the technology becomes non cost-effective.  At present, the implicit threshold is set at a 
range £20-30,000 (Appleby et al 2007).  In other words, as the ICER approaches the 
threshold it is less likely to receive a positive recommendation from the Appraisal 
Committee.  As the range provides the committee with an element of discretion, its 
decisions are regularly subject to discussion and challenge.  Typically, challenges relate 
to the inputs into the assessment process, the use of evidence, the methodology, the 
interpretation of the evidence and the procedures of the Appraisal Committee (Stevens 
and Longson 2013, p. 322) 
 
However, the HTA process is not directly under NICE’s control.  Instead, DH and the 
National Assembly for Wales are responsible for determining NICE’s work program 
(Stevens and Milne 2004).  Each year, the DH invites and receives suggestions from the 
pharmaceutical industry, professional organizations and patient groups on appropriate 
topics for NICE assessment and appraisal.  From this short list, the DH selects 
appropriate topics.  The topic selection process involves two elements: measuring new 
technologies and treatment areas against a set of selection criteria; and, the subsequent 
evaluation of identified technologies by a topic selection panel.  The DH selection criteria 
for identifying technologies include issues such as: the appropriateness of the topic to 
NICE’s remit; the potential of the topic to generate improvement in health and well-
being; the potential for added value; and the timeliness of the proposed topic (DH 2006).  
Following Ministerial approval, the topics are forwarded to NICE for evaluation.  While 
NICE is not permitted to remove or to add topics to the list, it conducts a public exercise 
to determine the comparators for each assessment and the outcomes for each technology 
that itshould assess (Stevens and Milne 2004). 
 One particularity of HTA is the UK is that in theory, NICE recommendations do not 
serve to influence pricing decisions. As described above, NICE decision only seeks to 
determine the extent to which health technologies will be reimbursed by the NHS. Prices 
are set freely by the manufacturer within a voluntary statutory framework known as 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (PPRS), which the DH and the Association of 
British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI) negotiate at regular intervals. Rather than 
directly controlling the price of individual products, the PPRS aims to provide an overall 
pricing framework under which it seeks to regulate the profitability levels of individual 
pharmaceutical companies through 2 levers, 1) Profit control through a % profit on 
capital employed (e.g R&D allowance) and 2) Price control through initial price 
agreement, increase restriction and cross-industry price-cuts price cuts (allowing portfolio 
price modulation) (Habl 2006).  If manufacturers exceed pre-agreed upon profitability 
levels, they must reduce their prices, postpone price increases, or pay back excess profits 
to the NHS.  At present, international price comparisons and cost-effectiveness 
information do not play a role in pricing decisions, but favour returning any excess 
profits to the NHA rather than reduce prices.   
 
Whilst HTA in the UK aims to determine reimbursement, it can however be argued NICE 
also plays an informal role in setting the prices of certain high cost innovative medicines. 
Indeed, through its use of the ICER which considers both costs and clinical effectiveness 
and the use of a willingness to pay threshold, NICE can encourage companies to lower 
their prices so that they fall under the threshold and obtain a positive recommendation.  
As a result, rather than negotiating prices with manufacturers, NICE engages into an 
iterative (pricing) process with manufacturers to encourage them to lower the price of 
their products. However, this process may soon be phased out as the current government 
is working towards a new pricing system under which the price of a drug will be 
negotiated directly with the manufacturer and become more closely linked to its clinical 
value (DH 2010), but the timing of its introduction has been subject to review.   
 
4. Institutionsand Process in Germany 
The German process for HTA is markedly different to those of the UK and other 
countries (Klingler et al 2013).  In Germany, the health system functions under a social 
insurance model.  Two institutions dominate the HTA process in Germany: The Federal 
Joint Committee (G-BA) and the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care 
(IQWiG). The G-BA is responsible for determining the benefit catalogue while the 
IQWiG informs those decisions. Technologies are included on the benefit catalogue by 
the G-BA when additional clinical benefit compared to the standard intervention is 
demonstrated; cost-effectiveness data plays only a minor role in those decision-making 
processes (GBA 2008; Fricke and Dauben 2009).  Established in 2004, IQWiG supports 
the G-BA through the conduct of clinical effectiveness analyses using the methods of 
evidence-based medicine (Perleth et al. 2009). However, in 2008, a new competition-
strengthening law was introduced - GKV-Wettbewerbsstärkungsgesetz – that added to its 
responsibilities the production of ‘cost-effectiveness data’, meaning the production of 
assessments which relate health impacts delivered through the use of new technologies to 
costs (Kosten-Nutzen-Bewertung). Those were thought to inform the National 
Association of Statutory Health Insurance Funds (GKV-Spitzenverband) (IQWiG 2008). 
With the new law, the GKV-Spitzenverband became responsible for setting the maximum 
reimbursement prices for innovative pharmaceutical technologies. Pricing decisions of 
the GVK-Spitzenverband were based on IQWiG’s cost-effectiveness studies (IQWiG 
2009). Therefore, IQWiG’s changing role reflected related changes at the GKV-
Spitzenverband. In 2010, the process for determining prices for new pharmaceutical 
products was altered again with the introduction of the Arzneimittelneuordnungsgesetz 
(AMNOG) law (DB 2010).  Under the reform, the GKV-Spitzenverband was given 
authority to conduct negotiations with the pharmaceutical industry to determine market 
prices based on IQWiG-generated clinical effectiveness assessments.  AMNOG 
diminished the importance of cost-effectiveness assessments to the decision making 
process quite significantly.  Under AMNOG, IQWiG’s cost-effectiveness assessments are 
consulted when negotiations stall and the intervention of an arbitrator—appointed by the 
groups involved — fails to deliver an agreement.  Under these circumstances, either party 
may request a cost-effectiveness assessment to determine the adequacy of the price set by 
the arbitrator.  In addition, the pharmaceutical company may also appeal to a formal cost-
effectiveness assessment when the G-BA finds no evidence of any additional clinical 
benefits associated with the new intervention (DB 2010; Klingler et al 2013). 
 
Where assessment becomes necessary, however, IQWiG applies a divergent approach to 
cost-effectiveness analysis compared with other EU countries.  In 2008, following the 
widening of its remit, IQWiG introduced the “Efficiency Frontier” approach. For any 
therapeutic area all available interventions need to be identified to construct the 
Efficiency Frontier. Costs and clinical effects (presented in any context-adequate benefit 
measure) of all available interventions need to be known before the Efficiency Frontier 
can be built. Once derived, the data are plotted on a coordinate system in which the y-axis 
displays clinical effect of the technology and the x-axis displays the costs of the 
intervention (Caro et al. 2010; Klingler et al 2013).  The Efficiency Frontier is 
constructed on the basis of the most efficient interventions, or in others words, the 
interventions that deliver the highest benefit for a given cost.   
 
Analysts establish the cost-effectiveness of the new technology by calculating the ICER. 
The calculations are made analogous to NICE, although IQWiG uses different 
effectiveness parameter or base for its threshold.  In the case of the IQWiG Efficiency 
Frontier, the cost-effectiveness threshold is set at the ICER of the second most effective 
intervention.   Researchers establish the ICER of the second most effective intervention 
based on information regarding the costs and clinical benefit of the second and third most 
effective interventions, which are generated through the Efficiency Frontier. The ICER of 
the second most effective intervention now serves as a kind of ad-hoc threshold. If the 
ICER of the intervention under evaluation falls below or on this ad-hoc threshold, the 
new intervention is deemed cost-effective.  Ultimately, prices are set to allow the ICER to 
fall on or below the threshold.  In other words, the Efficiency Frontier deduces an ad-hoc 
threshold to which the ICER of the new intervention is compared, allowing the price to 
be adjusted accordingly (IQWiG 2009; Caro et al. 2010; Klingler 2013 et al).  
 
Another important point of divergence from NICE is that IQWiG does not prioritise the 
use of the QALY (IQWiG 2008, 2009).  For IQWiG, any benefit measure that remain 
relevant to context and fulfil certain criteria, such as changes in risk profile, or changes in 
mortality measured in life years gained, can be applied.  Depending on the intervention 
under evaluation, IQWiG can use different benefit measures in its different assessments. 
QALYs can be used where deemed appropriate, but it is no necessary requirement as 
with NICE’s evaluations.  It is important to understand that the different decision making 
remits of IQWiG and NICE do not explain the divergent methodological decisions. Even 
though IQWiG’s assessments are made to inform pricing decisions and NICE, by 
contrast, makes procurement recommendations, the decision-making frameworks do not 
forestall the methods employed in HTA. Naturally, NICE is dependent on a benefit 
measure that can be used across therapeutic areas like the QALY. However, as the value-
based pricing movement in the UK will show, IQWiG could have used a method more 
similar to NICE’s for its pricing decisions. It would have been perfectly workable to base 
pricing decisions on a fixed and not a variable threshold across therapeutic areas.    
 
6. Discussion and Policy Implications 
Whereas a comparative perspective on the analysis of national approaches to HTA tends 
to conclude with core sets of policy lessons and summations of optimum methods and 
evidential requirements, a regulatory governance perspective is more relaxed about 
instances of divergence and hybridity, offering a range of insights into the factors that 
shape national approaches to HTA and the activities of institutions like NICE and IQWiG 
(Klingler et al 2013).  A regulatory governance perspective can also potentially suggest 
some means by which their operations can be improved.  
 
For example, some UK-based analysts have suggested that NICE sets an international 
‘benchmark’ for theassessment of new technologies, and that its processes derive from 
the practice of evidence based medicine (Stevens and Longson 2013; Stevens and Milne 
2004).  From a regulatory governance perspective, however, rather than setting a 
benchmark, NICE assessments involve a rigorous, and arguably expensive, set of 
economic analyses necessary to drive a health system that involves universal and free 
access to health care, and in which the profits and prices of pharmaceuticals are regulated 
by an initial agreement between industry and government.  In the UK, production of these 
assessments, and the use of the QALY, is necessary to make comparisons of the cost-
effectiveness of medicines across individual disease areas.  Given the structure of the UK 
health system, NICE appraisals need to establish whether or not public money is more 
effectively invested in the latest cancer treatment or the latest diabetes treatment to 
effectively ration health care.  
 
Currently, the UK DH is considering a new approach to the appraisals of branded 
medicines that involves value-based pricing (VBP) based on the same cost-per-QALY 
threshold (£20,000-30,000). Under VBP, products with an ICER significantly higher than 
the current threshold will not be excluded from reimbursement. Instead, prices will be 
negotiated and adjusted to allow its ICER to fall below the previously defined threshold, 
thereby mimicking the decision-making process in Germany, but with a stronger focus on 
cost-effectiveness data (DH 2010). Here, a possible policy decision focusing on price 
setting to ensure efficient resource use instead of exclusion from universal reimbursement 
is distilled from one context to another (Zentner and Busse 2011). However, it is unclear 
whether the German method for price setting as is a workable alternative in the UK 
context, and vice versa.  Indeed, the main difference after AMNOG is the focus on 
effectiveness vs. cost-effectiveness data for price setting.   
 
In Germany, by contrast, where prices are also negotiated, economic analysis has a 
significantly reduced role.  In Germany, the use of the Efficiency Frontier approach 
responds to an environment characterised by a requirement to deny, or ignore, the need to 
ration health care, and also an aversion to describing the benefits of health gains in 
monetary terms (Klingler et al 2013). Therefore, in the German context, NICE’s 
approach to cost-effectiveness assessment based on a fixed threshold making explicit the 
limited willingness to pay would not have been acceptable to the public and was avoided.  
The Efficiency Frontier offered the opportunity to make cost-effectiveness analysis – 
which depends on the definition of a threshold – work in the German context without 
having to reveal willingness to pay. The solution was a variable ad-hoc threshold 
different for every therapeutic area that seemed more acceptable (Klingler et al 2013). 
 
In the context of advanced industrial society, any sophisticated account of HTA must 
recognise that national approaches involve the potential for widely varying processes, 
methods and evidential requirements.  Of course, these divergences will be the 
consequence of a number of factors, only some of which we have alluded to here.  Some 
factors may be internal to the structure and organisation of national healthcare systems, 
while others may arise from historical and cultural factors associated with the delivery of 
healthcare.  In all cases, however, the pathway from the regulatory approval of new 
technologies to their use in clinical practice operates according to diverse national 
healthcare contexts.  Along the way, a wide variety of factors will intervene to influence 
the use and application of particular assessment methodologies and evidence bases, and 
also work against the possibilities for policy learning and transferability in any direct and 
easy fashion.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how NICE sets a benchmark for any other 
national health system than the particular one in which it operates.  Accordingly, 
advocates of more EU-wide collaboration in HTA need to bear in mind that policy 
makers respond to multiple stimuli in establishing national institutions and process for 
HTA and ‘best practice’ methods and optimum evidential requirements are but one 
element of this wider process.  For the future, the key challenge for health policy 
analysts, organisations like EUNetHTA in particular, is to develop and adopt an 
analytical framework capable of identifying and critically analysing insistences of 
divergence and hybridity with a view to improving the operation of individual national 
HTA systems.  
 
Note: 
The introductory sections of the paper draw upon work in other papers published by this 
research group (Klingler et el 2013; Shah et al 2014; Barron et el 2014). This is due to the 
fact that we have conducted this research together and have developed and applied the 
theoretical framework for analysis jointly. 
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